National Security Notebook | Number 4, April 27, 2026

What would it look like if Tehran looks beyond nukes?

For years, both Washington and Jerusalem have been fixated on Iran’s nuclear program, and the Iranian regime’s persistent will to acquire those capabilities despite all sorts of obstacles we (and others) have attempted to throw in its way.

Last summer’s “Twelve-Day War” was an effort to roll back Iran’s progress on that front, and by all indications it was highly successful – although, admittedly, we’re still quibbling about exactly how much. The more recent joint U.S.-Israeli military campaign focused at length on delivery systems; specifically, the Islamic Republic’s large and growing arsenal of ballistic missiles. (Here, too, we’ve made a significant dent, though it seems that there’s still work to be done.)

But what we’re not discussing nearly enough is what the regime might do next as a result. A new paper from the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA), an Israeli think tank attached to the country’s prestigious Tel Aviv University, offers some thoughts, and they’re not particularly comforting ones. Here’s the key excerpt:

Alongside Iran’s persistent progress towards nuclear weapons, which was recently stemmed – apparently for good – by Israel and the US, the Islamic regime possesses arsenals of other weapons of mass destruction, specifically chemical and biological weapons (CBW). Now that its nuclear strategy has been largely derailed, the Iranian regime is likely to continue to pursue and to considerably upgrade its ballistic capabilities, particularly in terms of CBW warheads. Ballistic CBW warheads (possibly including radiological weapons as well) will thus constitute Iran’s primary strategic offensive alignment.

Moreover, the paper lays out, the Islamic Republic has built up a significant infrastructure for the development of CBW. It encompasses pharmaceutical firms, research labs and assorted companies developing means of technical distribution. While some of these institutions were targeted as part of the recent American-Israeli military operation, the regime’s CBW capabilities were not a major focus.

Which naturally suggests that, as Iran’s remaining regime seeks to rebuild its deterrent capabilities vis-à-vis the West, it will logically turn to this largely open avenue. Or as the BESA paper puts it:

If self-production of ballistic missiles is continuously blocked or halted in Iran, the regime may either convert residual stocks of conventional warheads into CB warheads or purchase ballistic missiles with empty warheads from China, Russia or North Korea for the purpose of chemically and biologically supplementing them. At least one of the three allies is likely to consent to such a supply request.

Hopefully, as we try to coerce Tehran into new negotiations over its nuclear program and regional posture, we are watching this space as well.